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In recent years, heterodox economists have been interested in three approaches to money: the credit money, state 
money, and endogenous money approaches. The primary purpose of this article will be to draw out explicitly the 
links among the three approaches to money. Thus, begin by discussing the nature of money via historical and 
sociological analysis, contrasting the typical orthodox story that focuses on a natural and largely asocial 
approach to money with a heterodox, social approach. It will be seen that views on the nature of money are 
important for understanding differences between orthodox and heterodox approaches to money. We next turn to 
relatively brief surveys of the three alternative heterodox approaches before discussing a possible integration.  
The state money approach is associated with Knapp (1924), Keynes (1930), and Lerner (1947), while the 
credit money approach is associated with Schumpeter (1934) and more loosely with some of the progenitors of 
the endogenous money approach—especially with the French-Italian “circuit” approach, and also with Minsky’s 
views. Innes (1913, 1914) provided an integration of the state money and credit money approaches, but his work 
was long forgotten.1 Post Keynesians (and to a lesser extent, Institutionalists) have participated in a modern 
revival of an endogenous money approach that had been common in the nineteenth century, although most recent 
writers on the endogenous money approach have not explored links to the credit money and state money 
approaches.2  
While this article will not trace the development of the endogenous money approach, nor will it examine 
recent controversies among the camps of its supporters3, it will show how the endogenous money approach 
relates to the state money and credit money approaches. By intention, what follows is a survey that attempts to 
find common ground in heterodox approaches, not only contrasting the shared general approach to money with 
the orthodox approach, but also pointing the direction toward a possible integration acceptable to heterodoxy. 
 
THE NATURE AND EVOLUTION OF MONEY: SOCIAL OR NATURAL? 
Many analyses of money begin with some story about the evolution of money from sea shells, to precious metals, 
to bank deposits and finally to modern “fiat” money. Why do economists begin monetary analysis with a potted 
history? Perhaps it is to focus attention on the essential characteristics, or nature, of money. To be sure, we will 
never “know” the origins of money for at least two important reasons. First, the origins are lost “in the mists of 
time” almost certainly in pre-historic time. (Keynes 1930, p. 13) It has long been speculated that money predates 
writing because the earliest examples of writing appear to be records of monetary debts meaning that the closely 
intertwined chronology of the development of writing and money will make it impossible to find a written 
 
1 See Wray 2004 for analysis of the contributions of Innes; see Keynes (1914) for a favorable review of the 1913 article by Innes. 
2 See Cramp 1962 for one of the earliest attempts to resurrect the endogenous money approach in the aftermath of the development of the 
neoclassical synthesis that had relegated money to the back-burner. See Moore 1988 for one of the most definitive explications. Wray 1990 is 
one of the few works that tries to integrate the endogenous money approach with the state money approach. The French-Italian Circuit 
School also adopts Schumpeter’s credit money approach--see Deleplace and Nell 1996—and has been embraced by many of the modern 
endogenous money supporters (Lavoie 1985), however, the Circuit approach has generally ignored the state money approach. 
3 In particular, we will not explore the so-called horizontalist versus structuralist debate that took place in the late 1980s. See Moore 1991 and 
Pollin 1991. 
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history. Second, recent scholarship indicates that the origin of writing, itself, is exceedingly complex it is not so 
simple to identify what is “writing”. (Schmandt-Besserat 1989) Similarly, it is not clear what we want to identify 
as money. Like writing, money is social in nature and it consists of complex social practices that include power 
and class relationships, socially constructed meaning, and abstract representations of social value. (More below.) 
As Hudson (2004) rightly argues, ancient and even “primitive” (tribal) society was no less complex than today’s 
society. (See also Polanyi 1971 and Gardiner 2004.) Economic relations, including what we might want to 
identify as monetary relations, were highly embedded within complex social structures that are very difficult to 
uncover and understand from our cultural and historical vantage point. As a result, trying to uncover “the” 
origins of money is almost certainly an impossible or at least misguided endeavor unless it is placed within the 
context of a theoretical framework. When we attempt to discover the origins of money, we are identifying 
institutionalized behaviors that appear similar to those today that we wish to identify as “money”. This 
identification, itself, requires an underlying economic theory about the nature of, and role played by, money. 
For example, the barter story usually told by orthodoxy highlights the medium of exchange and store of 
value functions of money. A natural propensity to truck and barter is taken for granted. Attention is diverted 
away from social behavior and toward individual utility calculation. Social power and economic classes are 
purged from the analysis, while “the market” is exalted. The story focuses on transactions-cost reducing 
innovations, except where government interferes, creating inefficiencies to be overcome. And this story is 
consistent with the neoclassical worldview, because the orthodox economist sees exchange, markets, and relative 
prices wherever she looks. For the orthodox economist, the essential difference between “primitive” and modern 
society is that these early societies are presumed to be much simpler relying on barter or commodity monies. 
Hence, economic relations in earlier society are more transparent; innate propensities are laid bare in the 
Robinson Crusoe economy for the observing economist. Gradually more complex financial practices emerge to 
reduce transactions or evade government-imposed constraints as money is naturally transformed from a 
commodity to fiat notes and finally to electronic charges stored in computers that introduce an increasingly 
opaque veil concealing primordial urges. 
On the surface, this appears to be an “evolutionary” approach that recognizes human agency in the 
transformation from barter to fiat money.  
However, the orthodox economists turn money into a “natural” phenomenon free from essential social 
relationships. Although economists allow that money is a human invention assuming different forms in different 
times and places, they adopt an evolutionary perspective that de-emphasizes money’s contingency and its 
ultimate foundation in social convention. As capitalist economies became more complex, money ‘naturally’ 
assumed increasingly efficient forms, culminating in the highly abstract, intangible money of today. (Carruthers 
and Babb 1996, p. 1558) 
The story typically begins with a double coincidence of wants that spurs barter, leading to specialization 
and the development of the market.  
The market, itself, is relatively free of social relations, because efficiency conditions require participants to 
ignore social status and other socio-cultural and individual idiosyncrasies as utilities are maximized and costs 
minimized. It is “natural” to choose a convenient medium of exchange to facilitate these impersonal transactions. 
The value of each marketed commodity is denominated in the medium of exchange through the asocial forces of 
supply and demand. Not only is money asocial, but it is also neutral as it greases the wheels of commerce. The 
ideal medium of exchange is a commodity whose value is intrinsic—free from any hierarchical relations or 
social symbolism. As markets become more complex, money is transformed to minimize transactions costs 
through time. For example, precious metals like gold replace other commodities because their intrinsic 
characteristics can reduce transactions costs; paper notes are then issued on the basis of gold reserves, 
economizing on scarce bullion.  
From this viewpoint, it is regrettable that nations have abandoned the use of intrinsically valuable metallic 
money in favor of “fiat” monies that have no “natural” value.  
Some economists advocate return to a gold standard, but most accept that this is (at least) politically 
infeasible.1 Hence, it is necessary to remove as much discretion as possible from monetary and fiscal authorities, 
to try to ensure that modern fiat money operates in a manner similar to that of commodity money. Monetary 
growth rules, prohibitions on treasury money creation, balanced budget requirements, and the like (not to 
mention currency boards and dollarization for developing nations), are all attempts to remove discretion and 
thereby restore the natural, asocial, neutered, monetary order.2 Even some “pure credit” heterodox theorists 
argue that government is, or should be, in the same situation as any other “individual”, with liabilities that have 
to compete in financial markets, constrained by the quantity of money they can tax or borrow to finance their 
 
1 Friedman (1982) is an example. 
2 Again, Friedman’s version of Monetarism is a good example; see also Greenspan’s recent testimony in which he argued that “since the late 
‘70s, central bankers generally have behaved as though we were on the gold standard.” (Greenspan 2005)  The Currency School represented 
an earlier example—see Wray 1990. 
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spending. (Merhling 2000; Rossi 1999). Thus, for many analysts, social relations are hidden behind money’s veil. 
Carruthers and Babb provide one of the most incisive analyses of the asocial nature of money in orthodox theory.  
They quote Hilferding affirmatively: In money, the social relationships among human beings have been 
reduced to a thing, a mysterious, glittering thing the dazzling radiance of which has blinded the vision of so 
many economists when they have not taken the precaution of shielding their eyes against it. (Quoted in 
Carruthers and Babb, 1996, p. 1556) Simmel put it even more concisely: money transforms the world into an 
“arithmetic problem”. (Quoted in Zelizer 1989, p. 344) The underlying relations are “collectively ‘forgotten 
about’” in order to ensure that they are not explored.1 (Carruthers and Babb 1996, p. 1559) Doubters need only 
examine how money is introduced as little more than an afterthought into modern macroeconomic (“arithmetic”) 
analyses (and recall Friedman’s 1969 famous presumption that money is simply dropped by helicopters).2  
The (intended?) effect of neutering money is to hide the social relations behind a natural (transactions costs 
reducing) veil of asocial market exchange. To uncover those social relations, I will argue that the heterodox 
economist cannot begin analysis of money with market exchange. While heterodox economists try to avoid the 
orthodox “economistic” blinders, tracing the origins of money necessarily requires selective attention to those 
social practices we associate with money—knowing full well that earlier societies had complex and embedded 
economies that differ remarkably from ours. I believe that the credit money and state money approaches, 
properly integrated, can provide the starting point. The key concept is debt (or, credit, if we look at it from the 
other side of the coin)—not “market exchange”. The credit approach brings the debt/credit relation to the 
forefront of analysis, while the state money approach emphasizes the social nature of the money of account in 
which credits and debts are denominated. 
The credit approach locates the origin of money in credit and debt relations. The analysis is inherently 
social—at the very least it requires a bilateral relation between debtor and creditor. The unit of account is 
emphasized as the numeraire in which credits and debts are measured. The store of value function could also be 
important, for one stores wealth in the form of others’ debts. On the other hand, the medium of exchange 
function and the market are de-emphasized; indeed, one could imagine credits and debits without markets and 
without a medium of exchange.  
However, it is not sufficient to pose a “social relation” between debtor and creditor, for one could argue that 
the Robinson Crusoe and Friday story also involves a bilateral “social” relation with a mutually agreed-upon 
choice of a numeraire. One obvious difference, however, is that the credit/debt relation is persistent—until the 
debt is retired—while the Crusoe-Friday relation is extinguished with the exchange.3 There is thus an explicit 
and lasting social relation between creditor and debtor that could include hierarchy and power.  
Those who adopt the credit approach go further, identifying the social nature of the money unit of account 
and, indeed, the social processes that generate creditors and debtors. (Ingham 2000, 2004a, 2004b; Hudson 2004; 
Henry 2004)  We must carefully avoid imposing 21st century social relations on ancient peoples, replacing 
“trucking and bartering” with a natural propensity to lend and borrow. Indeed, the evidence suggests that one 
would not have voluntarily become a debtor, a reluctance also suggested by the etymology of the words 
associated with debt—see below.  
Hence we should not automatically presume that credit emerged from mutually beneficial negotiations; we 
might even say that there is nothing “natural” about credit/debt—rather, this relation develops and evolves as a 
result of complex social, historical, and economic forces. Innes (1913, 1914, 1932) suggested that we can locate 
the origins of credit and debt relations in the elaborate system of tribal wergild designed to prevent blood feuds. 
(See also Grierson 1977; 1979; Goodhart 1998; and Wray 1998) Wergild fines were paid by transgressors 
directly to victims and their families, and were established and levied by public assemblies. A long list of fines 
for each possible transgression was socially developed (not as a result of negotiation between perpetrator and 
victim), and a designated “rememberer” would be responsible for passing it down to the next generation. Note 
that each fine was levied in terms of a particular item that was both useful to the victim and more-or-less easily 
obtained by the perpetrator. The transgressor’s family would be held responsible for payment, and the fines 
would be enforced by the community.  
 
1 Ingham summarizes Marx’s similar argument: “monetary relationships do not merely represent a natural economic reality, but also mask 
the latter’s underlying reality of the social relations of production…. For Marx there are two veils. Behind money lie ‘real’ economic forces, 
as they do in a somewhat different manner in orthodox economics. In turn, behind these economic forces lie the ‘real’ social relations, which 
also appear as monetary relations. Tearing away these monetary masks or veils will demystify capitalism and its money, which will become 
‘visible and dazzling to our eyes’.” (Ingham 2004b, pp. 61-62) 
2 Goodhart notes that orthodoxy “tries to turn economic analysis into an ‘arithmetic problem’…dropping successively social relations, 
economic history, and the politics of erstwhile ‘political economy’ from the pure, mathematical, but often jejune, core of economic analysis. 
We need to turn back that tide….” (Goodhart 2005) 
3 Of course, initially Crusoe as seller would not accept the commodity chosen as the medium of exchange unless it were intrinsically valuable, 
although there is an expectation that it can be used for future market transactions. One could argue that this makes for more complex social 
linkages, including expected future exchange  relations among individuals—although the individual seller and buyer may not again engage in 
any transactions. In practice, when one buys goods at the local “big box” store, any social interaction with the cashier is minimal and fleeting, 
even though one expects that there will be exchanges in the future. 
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As Hudson (2004) reports, the words for debt in most languages are synonymous with sin or guilt, 
reflecting these early reparations for personal injury. Originally, until one paid the wergild fine, one was “liable”, 
or “indebted” to the victim. We still think of a traffic fine as an “obligation” to pay, and speak of the criminal’s 
“debt to society”.  Thus, we should not imagine an economy of independent agents voluntarily lending and 
borrowing to maximize utility. Rather, the debt/credit relation was involuntarily and socially created and 
imposed to “pacify” the victim (to make peace, and from which comes our verb “to pay”). Hudson also makes it 
clear that the words for money, fines, tribute, tithes, debts, man-price, sin, and, finally, taxes are so often linked 
as to eliminate the possibility of coincidence. It is almost certain that wergild fines were gradually converted to 
payments made to an authority. (Wray 1998; Peacock 2003-4) This could not occur in an egalitarian tribal 
society (in which payments were made to victims, not authorities), but had to await the rise of some sort of 
ruling class. As Henry (2004) argues for the case of Egypt, the earliest ruling classes were probably religious 
officials, who demanded tithes (ostensibly, to keep the gods happy). Alternatively, conquerors required payments 
of tribute by a subject population.  
Tithes and tribute thus came to replace wergild fines, and fines for “transgressions against society” (that is, 
against the crown), paid to the rightful ruler, could be levied for almost any conceivable activity. (See Peacock 
2003-4; Maddox 1969; and Innes 1932.1) 
Eventually, taxes would replace most fees, fines and tribute (although this occurred surprisingly late—not 
until the 19th century in England). (Maddox 1969) These could be self-imposed as democracy swept away the 
divine right of kings. “Voluntarily-imposed” taxes proved superior to payments based on naked power or 
religious fraud because of the “democratic” nature of the decision to impose them “for the public good”. The 
notion that taxes “pay for” provision of “public goods” like defense or infrastructure added another layer of 
justification, as did the occasionally successful attempt to convert taxes from a “liability” to a “responsibility”.  
In any case, with the development of “civil” society and reliance mostly on payment of taxes rather than 
fines, tithes, or tribute, the likely origin of such payments in the wergild tradition has been forgotten. 
At this point, we move from the credit approach to the state money approach. We have seen how the 
debt/credit relation was transformed with the rise of an authority able to impose debts on subjects (and later, by 
“citizens” who collectively imposed debts on themselves).2 The question is: how did this debt become monetized? 
The key innovation lay in the transformation of what had been the transgressor’s debt to the victim, denominated 
in specific items to be used for “pacification”, to a universal “debt” or tax obligation imposed by and payable to 
the authority in terms of a socially recognized numeraire. This required standardization of the imposed 
obligations in terms of a unit of account—almost certainly a tortuous transformation. At first, the authority might 
have levied a variety of fines (and tributes, tithes, and taxes) in kind, in terms of goods or services to be 
delivered, one for each sort of transgression (as in the wergild tradition). When all payments are made to the 
single authority, however, this would become cumbersome. Unless well-developed markets already existed, 
those with liabilities denominated in specific goods or services could find it difficult to make such payments. Or, 
the authority could find itself blessed with an overabundance of one type of good while short of others.  
Denominating payments in a unit of account would simplify matters—but would require a central authority. 
As Grierson (1977, 1979) realized, development of a unit of account would be conceptually difficult. (See also 
Henry 2004.) It is easier to come by measures of weight or length—the length of some anatomical feature of the 
ruler (from which, of course, comes our term for the device used to measure short lengths—the “ruler” used to 
measure a foot), or the weight of a quantity of grain.  
By contrast, development of a money of account used to value items with no obvious similarities (weight, 
height) required more effort. Hence, the creation of an authority able to impose obligations transformed wergild 
fines paid to victims to fines paid to the authority, and at the same time it created the need for and possibility of 
creation of the monetary unit.  
Orthodoxy has never been able to explain how individual utility maximizers settled on a single numeraire. 
(See Gardiner 2004 and Ingham 2004a.) While use of a single unit of account results in efficiencies, it is not 
clear what evolutionary processes would have generated the numeraire (even Selgin—one of the biggest 
supporters of the approach--admits that Austrians have not provided a convincing explanation; Klein and Selgin 
2000). According to the conventional story, the higgling and haggling of the market is supposed to produce the 
equilibrium vector of relative prices, all of which can be denominated in the single numeraire. However, this 
presupposes a fairly high degree of specialization of labor and/or resource ownership—but this pre-market 
specialization, itself, is hard to explain. (Bell, Henry, and Wray 2004) Once markets are reasonably well 
 
1 Good hart (2005, p. 759) notes that Innes “went on to link his early work on the social foundations of money, where one strand was the use 
of money as a compensation to the victim by wrongdoers, to a subsequent slashing attack on modern penal systems. The West, he wrote, had 
substituted in place of recompense to the victim, a system of forcing criminals to pay their duty to the state.” For a recent examination of 
crime and punishment in the West, see Wray 2000. 
2 A detailed examination of the evolution of fees, fines, tithes, and tribute imposed by authority to self-imposed taxes, and of the evolution of 
civil society from authoritarianism to democracy, is beyond the scope of this article. However, it is likely that these transformations are 
highly intertwined, and are linked to the evolution of the monetary system—a topic only briefly covered here. 
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developed, specialization increases welfare; however, without well-developed markets, specialization is 
exceedingly risky, while diversification of skills and resources would be prudent. Further, even if this 
specialization problem can be finessed, no evolutionary process that would generate a single unit of account has 
been identified. (Klein and Selgin 2000) It seems exceedingly unlikely that either markets or a money of account 
could have evolved out of individual utility maximizing behavior. 
It has long been recognized that early monetary units were based on a specific number of grains of wheat or 
barley. (Wray 1990, p. 7). As Keynes argued in his research on ancient monies, “the fundamental weight 
standards of Western civilisation have never been altered from the earliest beginnings up to the introduction of 
the metric system” (Keynes 1982, p. 239). These weight standards were then taken over for the monetary units, 
whether the livre, sol, denier, mina, shekel, or later the pound (all derived from weight units; see Keynes 1982; 
Innes 1913 p. 386; Wray 1998 p. 48) This relation between the words used for weight units and monetary units 
generated speculation from the time of Innes and Keynes that there must be some underlying link. Hudson (2004) 
explains that the early monetary units used in the temples and palaces of Sumer in the third millennium BC were 
created initially for internal administrative purposes: “the public institutions established their key monetary pivot 
by making the shekel-weight of silver (240 barley grains) equal in value to the monthly consumption unit, a 
‘bushel’ of barley, the major commodity being disbursed”. (Hudson 2004 p. 111) Hence, rather than the intrinsic 
value (or even the exchange value) of precious metal giving rise to the numeraire, the authorities established the 
monetary value of precious metal by setting it equal to the numeraire that was itself derived from the weight of 
the monthly grain consumption unit. This lends support to the argument that the unit of account was socially 
determined by the central authority (temple, palace, royal court, representative government) rather than the result 
of individual optimization that propelled the search for a numeraire to replace simple barter. 
Does the origin of money as a social unit of account used to measure obligations matter? Is money a social 
institution, or is it best characterized as a convenient medium of exchange? While Institutionalists and some Post 
Keynesians have long viewed money as an institution, indeed, as the most important institution in a capitalist 
economy, most heterodox economists have not delved deeply into this. (Important exceptions include Dillard 
1980 and Minsky 1986, and the sociologist Ingham 2000, 2004a, 2004b) However, if we are to understand the 
nature of money, it is important to uncover the social relations that are obscured by this institution. The credit 
money and state money approaches help to lift that veil by shedding light on the nature of money. In the next 
three sections, we look at each of these approaches and then point the way toward an integration with the better-
known endogenous money approach. 
 
THE CREDIT THEORY OF MONEY 
Schumpeter made a useful distinction between the “monetary theory of credit” and the “credit theory of 
money”.1 The first sees private “credit money” as only a temporary substitute for “real money”—possibly a 
“natural” money that is free of social relations. Final settlement must take place in real money, which is the 
ultimate unit of account, store of value, and means of payment. Exchanges might take place based on credit, but 
credit expansion is strictly constrained by the quantity of real money.  
Ultimately, only the quantity of real money matters so far as economic activity is concerned. Most modern 
macroeconomic theory is based on the concept of a deposit multiplier that links the quantity of privately created 
money (mostly, bank deposits) to the quantity of high powered money, HPM. This is the modern equivalent to 
what Schumpeter called the monetary theory of credit, and Friedman (or Karl Brunner) is a good representative. 
The real money that is the basis of deposit expansion should be controlled, preferably by a rule that will make 
modern fiat money operate more like the metallic money of the hypothesized past. 
The credit theory of money, by contrast, emphasizes that credit normally expands to allow economic 
activity to grow. This new credit creates new claims on HPM even as it leads to new production. However, 
because there is a clearing system that cancels claims and debits without use of HPM, credit is not merely a 
temporary substitute for HPM. Schumpeter does not deny the role played by HPM as an ultimate means of 
settlement, he simply denies that it is required for most final settlements. Like Schumpeter, Innes focused on 
credit and the clearing system, mocking the view that “in modern days a money-saving device has been 
introduced called credit and that, before this device was known all purchases were paid for in cash, in other 
words in coins.” (Innes 1913, p. 389) Instead, he argued “careful investigation shows that the precise reverse is 
true”. (Innes 1913, p. 389) Rather than selling in exchange for “some intermediate commodity called the 
‘medium of exchange’”, a sale is really “the exchange of a commodity for a credit”. 2  Innes called this the 
“primitive law of commerce”: “The constant creation of credits and debts, and their extinction by being 
cancelled against one another, forms the whole mechanism of commerce…” (Innes 1913, p. 393) He explains: 
 
1 As mentioned above, the Circuit approach follows Schumpeter in explicitly formulating a credit money model; we will not focus directly on 
that approach here, as there are many good explications. See Deleplace and Nell 1996. 
2 McIntosh (1988, p. 560) reports that virtually all sales on the outskirts of London between 1300-1600 were made on the basis of credit that 
could be carried on the books of merchants for years before the slate would be cleared.  
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By buying we become debtors and by selling we become creditors, and being all both buyers and sellers we are 
all debtors and creditors. As debtor we can compel our creditor to cancel our obligation to him by handing to him 
his own acknowledgment [sic] of a debt to an equivalent amount which he, in his turn, has incurred.1 (Innes 1913, 
p. 393) 
The market, then, is not viewed as the place where goods are exchanged, but rather as a clearinghouse for 
debts and credits: credits and debits are the focus, not market exchange. Indeed, Innes rejected the typical 
analysis of the medieval village fairs, arguing that these were first developed to settle debts (for example, 
bills of exchange were frequently payable at these fairs—see Wray 1990), with retail trade later developing 
as a sideline to the clearing house trade. Even if Innes goes too far in this claim, it is useful in emphasizing 
debts and credits and clearing as primary, with trade in goods and services of subsidiary interest—one of 
the ways in which one becomes a debtor or creditor (or clears debts). Innes viewed the creditor-debtor 
relation (not the barter exchange) as the fundamental social relation lying behind money’s veil. Further, 
there is no “natural” relation-free money that lies behind the credits and debts. Indeed, for Innes even HPM, 
including gold coins, is credit money—for reasons discussed in the next section. 
The credit approach as advanced by Innes and Schumpeter provides a more useful vision of monetary 
operations of a capitalist, “market”, economy than does the orthodox view of money serving as a lubricating 
medium of exchange. The monetary production economy as described by Marx, Veblen, and Keynes is 
dominated by a complex web of financial relations that were characterized by Minsky as “money now for 
money later” propositions. (Minsky 1986 p. 228) Money is not a veil that should be stripped away to 
observe the essential characteristics of the “market economy”.  
Rather, the money of account and those credit-debt relations are the key institutional relations of the 
capitalist economy. 
 
THE STATE THEORY OF MONEY 
Goodhart (1998) makes a useful distinction between the metalist, orthodox, approach and the chartalist—or state 
money--approach. (See also Lau and Smithin 2002, who prefer the term catallactic over metalist.) The latter 
emphasizes that money evolves not from a pre-money market system but rather from the “penal system” based 
on the ancient practice of wergild, as described above. (Grierson 1977, 1979; Goodhart 1998; Wray 1998) Hence, 
it highlights the important role played by “authorities” in the origins and evolution of money. More specifically, 
the state (or any other authority able to impose an obligation) imposes a liability in the form of a generalized, 
social unit of account--a money--used for measuring the obligation. This does not require the pre-existence of 
markets, and, indeed, almost certainly predates them (as discussed above). Once the authorities can levy such 
obligations, they can name what fulfills the obligations by denominating in a social unit of account those things 
that can be delivered, in other words, by pricing them. This resolves the conundrum faced by methodological 
individualists and emphasizes the social nature of money and markets—which did not spring from the minds of 
individual utility maximizers, but rather were both socially created.2  
Note that the state can—in theory--choose anything to function as the “money thing” denominated in the 
money of account: “Validity by proclamation is not bound to any material” and the material can be changed to 
any other so long as the state announces a conversion rate (say, so many grains of gold for so many ounces of 
silver). (Knapp 1924, 30; see also Wray 1990, 1998.) In practice, the state needs to choose something that cannot 
be readily counterfeited (hence, the state has used encased clay tablets, wooden tallies, stamped coins, and notes 
with special ink; Wray 1998, Hudson 2004). The state chooses the unit, names the thing accepted in payment of 
obligations to itself, and (eventually) issues the money-thing it accepts.  
In (almost) all modern developed nations, the state accepts the currency issued by the treasury (in the US, 
coins), plus notes issued by the central bank (Federal Reserve notes in the US), plus bank reserves (again, 
liabilities of the central bank)—together, HPM. The material from which the money thing issued by the state is 
produced is not important (whether it is gold, base metal, paper, or even digitized numbers at the central bank). 
No matter what it is made of, the state must announce its nominal value (that is to say, the value at which the 
money-thing is accepted in meeting obligations to the state) and accept it in payments made to the state.  
The state money approach might appear to be inconsistent with the credit money approach described in the 
previous section because it is not obvious that state money represents a credit/debt relation. Indeed, some critics 
of the state money approach imagine that markets operating on the basis of private credits and debits 
denominated in a money of account pre-existed the state or authorities. (Mehrling 2000) The state is then 
supposed to have inserted itself into the private money system, taxing and borrowing the private credit money 
for use in public expenditures. The state’s own money initially consists of “commodity money”—precious metal 
 
1 Moore offers a similar view: “All economic units in a credit money economy who sell real goods and services for money are in effect 
selling for credit”. (Moore 1988 p. 299) 
2 See Hudson (2004) for a description of price setting by authorities in the early granary empires of Mesopotamia; and Polanyi (1971) for the 
role of authorities in setting up markets and negotiating prices across borders.  
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coins whose value is determined by embodied bullion—not a credit money. Later, somehow, the state manages 
to dupe the public into accepting “fiat money” that is neither fish (debt) nor fowl (precious metal). Again, close 
control over the issue of intrinsically valueless state money is necessary to prevent inflation or hyperinflation. 
In contrast, Innes insisted that when the state spends, it becomes a debtor (as he said, “by buying we 
become debtors”) as it issues state money. Hence, even state money is credit money, however, as we will see, it 
is a special kind of credit, “redeemed by taxation”. (1914, p. 168) For the government, a dollar is a promise to 
‘pay’, a promise to ‘satisfy’, a promise to ‘redeem,’ just as all other money is. Innes argued that even on a gold 
standard it is not gold that government promises to pay: 
It is true that all the government paper money is convertible into gold coin, but redemption of paper issues in 
gold coin is not redemption at all, but merely the exchange of one form of obligation for another of an identical 
nature. (Innes 1914, p. 165) 
Whether the government’s IOU is printed on paper or on a gold coin, it is indebted just the same. What, then, is 
the nature of the government’s IOU? This brings us to the “very nature of credit throughout the world”, which is 
“the right of the holder of the credit (the creditor) to hand back to the issuer of the debt (the debtor) the latter’s 
acknowledgment or obligation”. (1914, p. 161)  
The holder of a coin or certificate has the absolute right to pay any debt due to the government by tendering 
that coin or certificate, and it is this right and nothing else which gives them their value. It is immaterial 
whether or not the right is conveyed by statute, or even whether there may be a statute law defining the 
nature of a coin or certificate otherwise. (1914, p. 161) Hence, we can integrate the state money and credit 
money approaches through the recognition of the “very nature of credit”, which is that the issuer must 
accept its own IOUs when presented (as when bank notes are returned to the issuing bank for redemption if 
conversion is promised, or to pay a debt owed to the issuing bank).  
What, then, is special about government? The government’s credit “usually ranks in any given city slightly 
higher than does the money of a banker outside the city, not at all because it represents gold, but merely 
because the financial operations of the government are so extensive that government money is required 
everywhere for the discharge of taxes or other obligations to the government.” (Innes 1914, p. 154) The 
special characteristic of government money, then, is that it is “redeemable by the mechanism of taxation” 
(Innes 1914, p. 15): “[I]t is the tax which imparts to the obligation its ‘value’…. A dollar of money is a 
dollar, not because of the material of which it is made, but because of the dollar of tax which is imposed to 
redeem it”. (Innes 1914, p. 152) This tax liability is imposed by the government on a sufficient proportion 
of the population that there is a nearly universal demand for the government’s own liabilities—which are 
necessary to pay taxes. By contrast, orthodox economists accept a “metalist” position (as Good hart 1998 
calls it), arguing that until recently, the value of the government’s money was determined by the gold used 
in producing coins or by the gold backing paper notes. However, in spite of the attention paid to the gold 
standard, it was actually in place for only a short period.  
Typically, the money-thing issued by the authorities was not gold-money nor was there any promise to 
convert the money-thing to gold. Indeed, as Innes insisted, throughout most of Europe’s history, the money-
thing issued by the state was the hazelwood tally stick: “This is well seen in medieval England, where the 
regular method used by the government for paying a creditor was by ‘raising a tally’ on the Customs or on 
some other revenue getting department, that is to say by giving to the creditor as an acknowledgment of 
indebtedness a wooden tally.” (Innes 1913, p. 398; see also Robert 1956; Maddox 1969; and Davies 1994) 
Other money-things included clay tablets, leather and base metal coins, and paper certificates.1  
Why would the population accept otherwise “worthless” sticks, clay, base metal, leather, or paper? Because 
these were evidence of the states liabilities that it would accept in payment of taxes and other debts owed to itself. 
The key power of the state was its ability to impose taxes: “[t] his government by law obliges certain selected 
persons to become its debtors…. This procedure is called levying a tax, and the persons thus forced into the 
position of debtors to the government must in theory seek out the holders of the tallies or other instrument 
acknowledging a debt due by the government.” (Innes 1913, p. 398) Contrary to orthodox thinking, then, the 
desirability of the money-thing issued by the state was not generally determined by intrinsic value, but by the 
nominal value set by the state at its own pay offices.2 Nor was the government’s money forced onto the public 
through legal tender laws. It is certainly true that governments often do adopt legal tender laws, but these are 
 
1 In any case, coinage was a very late development—coming thousands of years after credits and debts, and even sophisticated markets--that 
seems to have little to do with the search for a handy medium of exchange. See Cook (1958), Grierson (1977, 1979), Heinsohn and Steiger 
(1983, 1989), Kraay (1964), and Wray (1998, 2004). 
2 Note that coins did not have nominal values stamped on them until recently; value was simply proclaimed by the issuer and maintained at 
the pay offices. The value could be, and was frequently, changed by “crying down” (or less frequently by “crying up”) the value at which 
coins would be accepted at the pay offices. (Wray 1998, 2004) This is not to deny that a state’s currency could not fall to the value of 
embodied precious metal—for example, in external trade, or in other situations in which the state’s sovereignty was called into question. 
(Wray 1998, 2004; Goodhart 2003) 
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difficult to enforce and hence often ineffective.1 (Knapp 1924, p. 111) The power of government to impose a tax 
and to name what will be accepted in tax payment is sufficient, and certainly trumps legal tender laws. (Wray 
1998) 
Once the state has created the unit of account and named what can be delivered to fulfill obligations to the 
state, it has generated the necessary pre-conditions for development of markets. As Innes argued, credits and 
debts probably preceded markets, and indeed, created the need for markets. The quintessential debt is the tax 
obligation, which then creates the incentive for private credits and debts and then for markets—because those 
without the means of paying taxes could use markets to obtain those means. Evidence from Babylonia suggests 
that early authorities set prices for each of the most important products and services—perhaps those accepted to 
meet obligations to the authorities. Once prices in money were established, it was a short technical leap to 
creation of markets. This stands orthodoxy on its head by reversing the order: first money and prices, then 
markets and money-things (rather than barter-based markets and relative prices, and then numeraire money and 
nominal prices). The next step was the recognition by the authority that it could issue the money-thing to 
purchase the mix it desired, then receive the same money-thing in the tax payments by subjects/citizens. This 
would further the development of markets because those with tax liabilities but without the goods and services 
the authority wished to buy would have to produce for market to obtain the means of paying obligations to the 
state.  
There need not be any conflict between credit money and state money approaches. The state provides the 
unit of account in which private credits and debts are denominated. The state denominates tax liabilities in that 
same money unit, and names what can be delivered in tax payment. The modern state issues HPM--its liability 
that is accepted in tax payment—as it spends. The private sector not only uses HPM for tax payment, but also for 
net clearing of private debts. The state even accepts some private liabilities in payments to the state, although 
ultimate clearing takes place in the state’s HPM. In the next section we turn to the endogenous money approach, 
and a more detailed look at the role played by HPM in net clearing.  
 
THE ENDOGENOUS MONEY APPROACH 
Beginning in the early 1970s there has been a revival of the endogenous money approach that had been followed 
by the Banking School of the early 19th century as well as by Marx several decades later. (It could be argued that 
most economists before WWII accepted some version of endogenous money, and that the exogenous approach 
gained dominance only with the development of the neoclassical synthesis. See Wray 1990.) This culminated in 
the “horizontalist” approach to money advanced by Moore (1988) that emphasizes the nondiscretionary nature of 
reserves.2 This effectively reverses the “deposit multiplier” of the money and banking textbooks, arguing that 
“loans make deposits” and “deposits make reserves”. (See also Lavoie 1985.) 
The focus is on the private decisions made by banks and their customers, which determine the supply of 
loans and deposits, hence, the supply of credit money that “endogenously” expands to meet the needs of trade. 
The central bank can only “exogenously” set the short-term interest rate (federal funds rate in the US, repo rate 
in the UK) at which it supplies reserves “horizontally” on demand to banks. Finally, the endogenous money 
approach rejects even long-run neutrality of money, arguing that the creation of money is tied to the fundamental 
processes of a capitalist economy, thus, money always matters. These points are all well-established in the Post 
Keynesian literature and do not require further elaboration here. (Lavoie 1985; Moore 1988; Wray 1990, 1998) 
The links between the endogenous money approach and the credit money approach discussed above should 
be obvious. The difference is really one of emphasis, with the endogenous money approach focusing more upon 
bank and central bank decision-making and interactions, while the credit approach has been more interested in 
identifying the nature of credit/debt relations. The fundamental property of all credit, according to Innes, is that 
its issuer must accept it; the endogenous money equivalent is the Banking School reflux principle: excess bank 
deposits return to banks to retire loans. (Wray 1990) There certainly is no conflict between the endogenous 
money emphasis on the monetary role played by bank liabilities and the credit money claim that bank money is 
debt.  
The endogenous money approach also recognizes that today’s HPM is the debt of the government (treasury 
and central bank), although it is not clear that all followers of this approach would agree with Innes that all 
money—even gold coin—is debt. 
What has largely been neglected in the endogenous money literature is the role of the state and the impact 
of fiscal operations on banks and the central bank.3 At least in the horizontalist version, the role of the state is 
limited to the central bank’s ability to set the overnight interest rate, which requires that it passively 
 
1 Indeed, there are no legal tender laws “backing” the euro. 
2 A related approach that recognizes the essential points of horizontalism is the French-Italian circuit theory. I will not address internal 
debates, such as that between horizontalists and “structuralists”. 
3 Many explications of the Circuit approach do not even include government. Parguez (2002) is an exception, as he introduces state finance 
into a circuit model. 
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accommodate bank demand for reserves. Indeed, the index to Moore’s 1988 book (Moore 1988) does not even 
list entries for fiscal policy, treasury, or taxes, and discussion of the connection between fiscal and monetary 
policy is limited to a brief argument that governments in the Third World are generally biased toward low 
interest rates because they are typically the largest borrower in any economy. (Moore 1988, pp. 67-68) By 
implication, government is seen to be in the same position as any other economic agent, financing its spending 
either by running down deposit balances, or through borrowing from financial institutions. Hence, relations 
between the state money approach and the endogenous money approach remain relatively unclear. It is 
somewhat surprising that fiscal effects on reserves are largely ignored in the endogenous money literature, 
because these are potentially many times larger than the quantities of reserves added or drained by central bank 
operations.1 Some of those who adopt the endogenous money approach have even argued that central bank 
behavior should be analyzed separately from fiscal operations, as the central bank is formally independent of the 
treasury in many nations. (Van Lear 2002; Mehrling 2000)  
In reality, however, the central bank’s desire to set and hit overnight rate targets means that it cannot be 
independent of the treasury—in the sense that any undesired impact of fiscal operations on banking system 
reserves must be immediately and completely offset by central bank operations. All else equal, treasury spending 
leads to a credit to banking system reserves while tax payments lead to a debit, thus, treasury deficits lead to net 
credits. In practice, daily operations of the treasury would almost always generate either net credits or net debits 
even if the budget were balanced over the course of the year for the simple reason that tax payments on any 
given day would differ from government spending on that day. Hence, the treasury and central bank have created 
complex procedures that allow them to closely coordinate activities to minimize effects on reserves. These 
reserve effects of fiscal operations have been a central concern of the Chartalist literature. (See Wray 1998; Bell 
2000; Bell and Wray 2002; and Parguez 2002.) 
None of this really requires revision of the horizontalist, or more generally the endogenous money, 
approach that is consistent with both the credit and the state money approaches. According to the state money 
approach, the state chooses the unit of account (the dollar, for example) in which the privately-issued credit 
moneys are denominated. The state also chooses which moneys it will accept in payment of taxes. In modern 
sovereign nations with their own domestic, floating, currencies, this is always an inconvertible, high powered, 
money (liabilities of the treasury and central bank). Private banks help in clearing between the government and 
the private sector, since most taxes are “paid” using bank accounts and most recipients of treasury checks deposit 
them into private banks. In these operations, the private banks act as intermediaries making payments to the 
government on behalf of their depositors, and crediting depositors with government payments. The central bank 
and treasury then coordinate activities to offset undesired impacts on bank reserves, allowing the central bank to 
exogenously set and hit the overnight rate target. The high powered money accepted by the state in such 
countries is always a credit money, a liability of the treasury or central bank, and hence operates according to 
Innes’ fundamental law of credit—or the law of reflux cited by the followers of the endogenous money approach.  
That is to say, state liabilities (HPM) are destroyed when they return to the state, mostly in tax payments or bond 
purchases by the non-government sector. Still, we are left with a question: must an endogenous money approach 
adopt a chartalist, or state money, approach? An endogenous money approach could possibly locate the origins 
of money in barter, or in a primordial “free market” economy free from government intrusion (as in Parguez and 
Seccareccia 2003).2 As discussed above, it is not so important to finally uncover the “true” origins of money, but 
rather, to explicate the “nature” of money. The question is whether a hypothesized stateless but monetary 
economy sheds any important light on the nature of the modern money we use. Does it help us to understand the 
“horizontal” monetary policy of modern central banks? Does it reveal the social relations important to the 
operation of modern capitalist economies? Is our understanding enhanced by presuming that the money of 
account originated from the spontaneous adoption by individuals of a numeraire to denominate their private 
credits and debits? 
In my view, the notion that private credit monies are denominated in a chartalist, national, unit of account is 
far more illuminating.3 Further, there is a “pyramidal” monetary hierarchy that rules clearing—most private 
clearing of accounts takes place on the balance sheets of banks, while banks use the central bank for ultimate, or 
net, clearing.4 All of this is in terms of the national currency. Finally, the central bank is the ultimate clearer for 
 
1 Bell and Wray (2002) represent a significant exception. See below. 
2 See Lau and Smithin for a critique: “the monetary order is socially constructed, rather than deriving automatically from the market. 
Essentially…there would have to be a social consensus that the liabilities of the powerful institution ‘count as’ money. It is easy to see, 
therefore, why historically/empirically the state with its coercive powers has been in the driver’s seat.” (Lau and Smithin 2002 p. 19) 
3 Hence, the beaver pelts in the story told about colonial Canada by Parguez and Seccareccia (2003) are not “money” but rather are valuable 
commodities priced in the chartalist money of the colonial powers; Innes similarly argues that in the case of  “the various colonial laws, 
making corn, tobacco, etc., receivable in payment of debt and taxes, these commodities were never a medium of exchange in the economic 
sense of a commodity, in terms of which the value of all other things is measured. They were to be taken at their market price in money.” 
(Innes 1913, p. 378) 
4 See Bell 2001 for discussion of the pyramid. 
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private-government transactions. While all credit money—even that issued by the treasury and central bank—
represents a liability, this does not put all liabilities on an equal playing field. Further, as almost all liabilities in 
any given sovereign nation are denominated in the national currency, it becomes possible to clear accounts in 
that currency using liabilities high in the debt pyramid. At the same time, it becomes desirable to hold these 
liabilities for clearing. If such a hierarchy is important, then starting analysis without a treasury or central bank is 
deficient. 
Today only the sovereign government can impose liabilities on others. This puts it in a privileged position 
because it can create a demand for its own liabilities simply by requiring that taxpayers must deliver government 
liabilities in payment of taxes. It can also enact legal tender laws and legal reserve requirements to try to provide 
further privilege to treasury and central bank liabilities. Finally, the modern state is, of course, a very large 
entity—hence an important purchaser of output and source of income—which makes its liabilities ubiquitous. 
Still, if the state did not impose tax liabilities in its currency and require ultimate payments to itself in the form 
of its treasury and central bank liabilities, it is difficult to believe that its sheer size and its legal tender laws 
alone would be sufficient to guarantee its current spot at the top of the money hierarchy.  
Perhaps the more significant and contentious point concerns the implication of the state money approach for 
government budgetary issues. As Lerner (1943, 1947) recognized, the “money as a creature of the state” 
approach leads logically to a “functional finance” view of state budgeting. Because the state spends by emitting 
its own liability, it does not need tax revenue or the proceeds from borrowing in order to spend. Thus, the first 
principle of functional finance is that the state should increase taxes only if the public’s income were too high 
(threatening inflation). The second principle is that the state should “borrow” (sell bonds) only if “it is desirable 
that the public should have less money and more government bonds.” (Lerner 1943 p. 40) We will return to these 
points later but it is important to note how the state money approach conflicts with the conventional “government 
budget constraint” (GBC) notion, according to which state spending must be “financed” by tax revenues, 
borrowing, or “printing money”.1 In reality, the GBC is nothing but an ex post identity that conflates the state’s 
financial situation with that of a household. In any case, there is certainly nothing within the horizontalist or 
endogenous money approaches that requires a GBC approach to government finance. Indeed, it is a fundamental 
proposition of horizontalism that central bank provision of its own liabilities is limited only by demand—it can 
potentially supply reserves without limit. The state money approach simply extends that to the treasury—so long 
as state liabilities are demanded, they can be supplied by the state (central bank plus treasury).  
In the US, the Federal Reserve (Fed) is, like the treasury, ultimately a “creature of Congress”, and 
notwithstanding various claims about the desirability of the independence of the central bank, this is a typical 
arrangement in most developed nations. Leaving aside the logical impossibility of central bank “independence” 
from its treasury (since hitting overnight rate targets requires cooperation between treasury and central bank), the 
law-making body can direct its central bank to accommodate the treasury’s spending as necessary. (Indeed, if it 
did not, treasury checks could “bounce”.) While a GBC holds ex post as an accounting identity, it is not an 
operational constraint on treasury spending. 
In practice, once the central bank has met all the demand for bank reserves by crediting reserves as the 
treasury spends, additional treasury spending places downward pressure on the overnight rate, forcing bond sales 
(by the central bank and/or the treasury) to drain excess reserves and keep overnight rates on target. (Wray 1998; 
Bell 2000; Parguez 2002) While it might appear that the bond sales “finance” the treasury spending, in reality, 
bond sales logically are made after the spending takes place, and are undertaken to mop up the excess reserves 
that would push overnight rates below target. We, thus, return to the second principle of functional finance: 
bonds should be sold only if the private sector holds more HPM than desired, a situation that is manifested by 
overnight rates falling below target. Hence, the functional finance approach is ultimately consistent with the 
endogenous money approach that insists that reserves are nondiscretionary, indeed, the second principle of 
functional finance can be seen as a corollary of horizontalism—that bond sales are undertaken only to drain 
excess reserves. Thus, bond sales, even by the treasury, are nondiscretionary and permit the central bank to 
exogenously hit interest rate targets. 
Finally, note that both Keynesians and Institutionalists insist that at the aggregate level, saving does not 
finance investment, rather, that investment spending creates saving flows. (Keynes 1937; Foster 1981; Wray 
1998) In the expanded model, investment plus government spending injections determine aggregate saving plus 
taxes leakages; or investment plus the budget deficit creates an equivalent amount of saving.2  
There is thus a link between endogenous money and the recognition that saving does not finance investment, 
rather, expansion of loans finances increased spending (of any type).3 Just as saving (a leakage) cannot finance 
 
1 See Parguez (2002) for a similar critique of the GBC arguments. 
2 Parguez argues “Temporal causality is inherent to the monetary economy. Outlays determine income and therefore outlays are undertaken 
while income does not yet exist. This temporal dimension of the monetary economy explains why neither the state nor private firms can 
finance these outlays out of revenues generated in the future by what must be spent now.” (Parguez 2002 p. 88) 
3 There is a link between endogenous money growth and deficit spending. Basil Moore explains: “Saving is defined as current income not 
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investment (an injection), neither can taxes (a leakage) finance government spending (an injection) nor can 
saving (a leakage) finance a budget deficit (a net injection) because logically the injections must come first to 
generate the income that is then lost through the leakages. Careful analysis of balance sheets (a record of stocks 
that accumulate flows) strengthens the argument that taxes cannot provide a prior source of finance of 
government spending.1 While both investment and saving can take place on the balance sheets of the private 
sector, in the form of private credit money, both government spending and taxes must ultimately involve the 
balance sheets of the government sector (treasury and central bank). It is not possible for taxpayers and their 
banks to clear accounts with the government in HPM unless there is a mechanism for advance provision of the 
HPM to be used in clearing. Government spending is the primary source of HPM, although government (treasury, 
central bank, or other agents of government) can also lend HPM, purchase assets from the private sector, or 
provide HPM through transfer payments. Hence, Lerner’s functional finance and chartalist approaches (or, 
money as a creature of the state approach) are consistent with the usual Keynesian and Institutionalist views of 
the temporal relation between injections and leakages: the state must spend its liabilities into existence before 
they can be redeemed in taxation. (Parguez 2002) 
As Lerner argued, the purpose of government bond sales is not to borrow reserves (the government’s own 
IOU), but to offer an interest-earning alternative to undesired reserves that would otherwise drive the overnight 
rate toward zero. (Lerner 1943, 1947; Parguez 2002; Wray 1998)  Note that if the central bank paid interest on 
excess reserves, the treasury would never need to sell bonds because the overnight interest rate could never fall 
below the rate paid by the central bank on excess reserves. Note also that in spite of the widespread belief that 
government deficits push up interest rates, they actually reduce the overnight rate to zero unless the treasury and 
central bank coordinate efforts to drain the resulting excess reserves. (For many years the overnight interest rate 
in Japan has been kept at zero, in spite of government deficits that reached 8% of GDP, merely by keeping some 
excess reserves in the banking system.) On the other hand, budget surpluses drain reserves, causing a shortage 
that drives up the overnight rate unless the central bank and treasury buy and/or retire government debt. Needless 
to say, orthodoxy has got the interest rate effects of government budgets exactly backwards. 
 
CONCLUSION: AN INTEGRATION OF THE CREDIT, STATE MONEY, AND ENDOGENOUS 
MONEY APPROACHES 
To put it as simply as possible, the state chooses the unit of account in which the various “money things” (credit 
money instruments such as bank deposits or HPM) will be denominated. In all modern economies, it does this 
when it chooses the unit in which taxes will be denominated and names what is accepted in tax payments. 
Logically, imposition of the tax liability is what makes these money things accepted by the state desirable in the 
first place. And those things will become the (HPM) money-thing at the top of the “money pyramid” used for 
ultimate clearing. The state issues HPM in its own payments—in the modern economy by crediting bank 
reserves, and banks, in turn, credit accounts of their depositors. 
Of course, most transactions that do not involve the government take place on the basis of private credits 
and debits, that is, privately-issued credit money. This can be thought of as a leveraging of HPM. However, this 
should not be taken the wrong way—there is no fixed leverage ratio (as in the orthodox deposit multiplier story).  
Further, in all modern monetary systems the central bank targets an overnight interest rate, standing by to 
supply HPM on demand (“horizontally”) to the banking sector (or to withdraw it from the banking sector when 
excess reserves exist) to hit its target. Thus, both the CB and treasury supply HPM. The CB either buys assets or 
requires collateral against its lending, and it may well impose other “frown” costs on borrowing banks. Hence, 
while central bank provision of HPM provides a degree of slack to the system, HPM is never dropped by the 
central bank from helicopters—as Friedman famously assumed.2 In any case, the central bank and treasury 
coordinate to ensure the banking system has the amount of reserves required/desired using bond sales and 
purchases to adjust reserves to allow the central bank to hit its rate target.  
 
spent on current consumption goods. It may be defined alternatively as current income devoted to the accumulation of financial assets or to 
the repayment of debts. If an increased demand by saving units to accumulate financial assets is met by an equal increase in the supply of 
newly created financial assets issued by deficit-spending units, total aggregate demand will remain unchanged. The surplus spending by 
some economic units will then be exactly offset by the deficit spending of other economic units…. If total aggregate demand is to increase 
over time, this ordinarily necessitates a net increase in financial assets and liabilities for the economy as a whole. Aggregate demand can 
exceed last period’s income only if economic units in aggregate spend more than their current income.” (Moore 1988, pp. 296-7) 
1 Parguez agrees: “Both the state and firms cannot finance their outlays out of their future receipts, which are the outcome of the initial 
injection and which account for the ‘reflux’ phase of the monetary circuit. Both the state and firms are obliged to finance their expenditures 
by money creation…. The reflux phase…encompasses taxes by means of which the state recoups a share of the amount of money that had 
been injected in the flux phase. By their very nature, tax revenues must extinguish money by an equal amount… These taxes cannot logically 
be levied before the outlays upon whose existence they are based. There is no tax income that would exist before the flux outlays and the 
level of which would be predetermined relative to those outlays.” (Parguez 2002, pp. 87-88) 
2 If it were, that would be more akin to a welfare payment made by the treasury than to monetary policy undertaken by central banks. The 
difference between central bank provision of HPM and treasury provision is that treasury payments increase private sector income and 
wealth; a central bank provides reserves only through loans or through asset purchases, hence, does not directly increase income or wealth. 
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Likewise, the privately-supplied credit money is never dropped from helicopters. Its issue simultaneously 
puts the issuer in a credit and debit situation, and does the same for the party accepting the credit money. For 
example, a bank creates an asset (the borrower’s IOU) and a liability (the borrower’s deposit) when it makes a 
loan; the borrower simultaneously becomes a debtor (the bank holds his IOU) and a creditor (he holds a demand 
deposit). Banks then operate to match credits and debits while clearing net amounts in HPM. Borrowers operate 
in the economy to obtain bank liabilities to cancel their own IOUs to banks, to others in the private sector, and to 
government. Banks act as intermediaries in this clearing process, but they are more than intermediaries because 
they also create liabilities that can be used to finance employment and production. Thus, banks perform two 
important functions in a monetary economy: the “giro” function in which their balance sheets are used for 
clearing accounts, and the credit function in which their balance sheets expand to meet the needs of trade. (Wray 
1990) There is an important hierarchical relation in the debt/credit system, with power—especially in the form of 
command over society’s resources—underlying and deriving from the hierarchy. The ability to impose liabilities, 
name the unit of account, and issue the money used to pay down these liabilities gives a substantial measure of 
power to the authority.  
There is, thus, the potential to use this power to further the social good, although misunderstanding or 
mystification of the nature of money results in an outcome that often is far below what is economically feasible 
as government believes itself to be “constrained” by the principles of “sound finance”. Far from springing from 
the minds of atomistic utility maximizers, money is a social creation. The private credit system leverages state 
money, which in turn is supported by the state’s ability to impose social obligations mostly in the form of taxes. 
While it is commonly believed that taxes “pay for” government activity, actually obligations denominated in a 
unit of account create a demand for money that, in turn, allows society to organize social production, partly 
through a system of nominal prices. Much of the public production is undertaken by emitting state money 
through government purchase. Much private sector activity, in turn, takes the form of  “monetary production”, or 
M-C-M’ as Marx put it, that is, through monetary purchase of required inputs with a view to realizing “more 
money” from the sale of final product. The initial and final purchases are mostly financed on the basis of credits 
and debits—that is, “private” money creation. Because money is fundamental to these production processes, it 
cannot be neutral. Indeed, it contributes to the creation and evolution of a “logic” to the operation of a capitalist 
system, “disembedding” the economy to a degree never before encountered. (Heilbroner 1985; Wray 1990 p. 54)  
At the same time, many of the social relations can be, and are, hidden behind a veil of money. (Ingham 2004b) 
The veil makes it easy to imagine that all entities come on equal footing to the “marketplace” where their 
“dollars” compete on an equal basis. Economic analysis is reduced to “arithmetic”—consumers vote with their 
dollars, subject to budget constraints and exogenous preferences; producers react to these market signals. This 
orientation becomes most problematic with respect to misunderstanding about government budgets, where the 
monetary veil conceals the potential to use the monetary system in the public interest. The government, and 
public policy generally, is said to also face financial constraints imposed by monetary arithmetic—government 
budget constraints, Laffer Curves, financial trade-offs, interest rate effects and crowding-out, and portfolio 
preferences of private agents. As Ingham put it, “Tearing away these monetary masks or veils will demystify 
capitalism and its money, which will become ‘visible and dazzling to our eyes’.” (Ingham 2004b, pp. 61-62) An 
integration of credit money, state money, and endogenous money helps to demystify money and points toward 
different possibilities.  
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